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COMMENT
EVIDENCE OF OTHER CRIMES AS SUBSTANTIVE
PROOF OF GUILT IN MARYLAND
"The cases dealing with admissibility of prior criminal acts
are narrowly decided. Indeed, the results often appear
contradictory . . . . "1
1.

INTRODUCTION

In a Maryland criminal trial, the prosecution may not introduce
evidence of other crimes committed by a defendant in order to
demonstrate a probability of guilt of the crime alleged. 2 The
Maryland courts have consistently held that the past criminal
history of an individual does not inexorably compel a conclusion of
current criminal conduct or, more importantly, guilt of a particular
crime. 3 This general rule of exclusion of other crimes committed by
the defendant is founded upon the principle that no one should suffer
a criminal conviction solely because of a bad character.4
It is well settled that in a criminal trial the burden is upon the
state to prove that the defendant actually committed the crime
alleged. The trier of fact may not infer that the defendant is guilty
merely because of a possible criminal disposition evidenced by prior
convictions. Indeed, Maryland decisions relying on the general rule
of inadmissibility often note that the court is invoking the rule in an
attempt to avoid situations in which a defendant is convicted solely

1. Hoes v. State, 35 Md. App. 61, 67, 368 A.2d 1080, 1084 (1977l.
2. The application of the rule is illustrated in State v. Jones, 284 Md. 232, 395
A.2d 1182 (1979), in which the court held that in a prosecution for homicide
perpetrated in the commission of a robbery a prosecutor would not be able to
introduce evidence of other robberies committed by the defendant.
3. The Maryland cases which enunciate this general rule are abundant. See, e.g.,
Ross v. State, 276 Md. 664,669,350 A.2d 680, 684 (1976> (citing cases); Hoes v.
State, 35 Md. App. 61, 368 A.2d 1080 (1977); Setzer v. State, 29 Md. App. 347,
348 A.2d 866 (1975l.
4. Frequently those cases which state the general rule of exclusion note that it
merely implements the policy against bad character evidence. E.g., Ross v.
State, 276 Md. 664, 350 A.2d 680 (1976). The Ross opinion states:
The frequently enunciated general rule in this state, followed uniformly
elsewhere, is that in a prosecution for a particular crime, evidence
which in any manner shows or tends to show that the accused has
committed another crime wholly independent of that for which he is on
trial, even though it be a crime of the same type, is irrelevant and
inadmissible. . . . This principle is merely an application of the policy
rule prohibiting the initial introduction by the prosecution of evidence
of bad character.
Id. at 669, 350 A.2d at 684.
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because the prosecutor has demonstrated that the accused is a "bad
person" with anti-social propensities. 5
Nonetheless, proof of other crimes may be legitimately relevant
to some cases beyond the mere showing of criminal propensity. The
state may wish to show that the specific crime with which the
accused is charged is but one of a series designed to accomplish a
single criminal objective. Similarly, the state's attorney prosecuting
a defendant for shooting his wife could refute a defense of accident by
demonstrating that the accused had made similar attempts in the
past. Such considerations have led to the development of well
established exceptions to the general rule of exclusion. 6 Traditionally
in Maryland, evidence of other crimes is admissible when it
demonstrates motive,7 intent,S absence of mistake,9 identity,1O or a
5. E.g., Dobson v. State, 24 Md. App. 644, 335 A.2d 124 (1975); Babb v. State, 7
Md. App. 116, 253 A.2d 783, rev'd on other grounds, 258 Md. 547, 267 A.2d 190
(1969); Gilchrist v. State, 2 Md. App. 635, 236 A.2d 299 (1967l.
6. These exceptions to the general rule of exclusion are commonly referred to as
the "MIMIC" exception. "MIMIC" is mnemonic which enables one to recall
motive, intent, absence of mistake, identity, and common scheme.
7. E.g., Veney v. State, 251 Md. 182,246 A.2d 568 (968) <Defendant attempting to
avoid arrest for armed robbery killed police officer attempting to arrest him;
evidence of the robbery held properly admitted.>, cert. denied, 394 U.S. 948
(1969); Brown v. State, 220 Md. 29, 150 A.2d 895 (959) <Defendant who feared
prosecution for his numerous utterings of forged checks, killed police officer
arresting him for one uttering offense; evidence of the other check offenses held
properly admitted.>.
8. E.g., Wilson v. State, 181 Md. 1, 26 A.2d 770 (1942) (Woman who procured
illegal abortion from defendant doctor testified in a way that the jury could
have inferred that she had obtained another illegal abortion from the defendant
the previous year; evidence of the former transaction admissible as showing an
intent to perform unlawful abortions.>; Isaacs v. State, 31 Md. App. 604. 358
A.2d 273 (1976> nn defendant's trial for murder, kidnapping, and larceny,
female companion of defendant permitted to testify about prior crime spree
involving numerous thefts; evidence of the former crime spree admissible
apparently as demonstrative of the requisite intent for larceny.!.
9. E.g., Hoes v. State, 35 Md. App. 61, 368 A.2d 1080 (1977) {Defendant who shot
his live-in girlfriend claimed that his shotgun had accidentally discharged;
evidence that the defendant had shot the same victim five years earlier
admissible.); Nelson v. State, 5 Md. App. 109, 245 A.2d 606 (1968) (In a
prosecution for murder, evidence that defendant and his companions had
exchanged racial insults with the victim and his companions held admissible on
the grounds that the first incident demonstrated that participation in the
second was not a mistake.),
No Maryland case, however, places an exclusive reliance upon the absence
of mistake exception in admitting evidence of other crimes. In this context. see
text accompanying notes 57 & 58 infra. Both Hoes and Nelson illustrate this
assertion. In Hoes the evidence was ultimately admitted under the intent
exception, and the Nelson court thought that five different exceptions applied to
the situation before it. Indeed, in Hoes. despite the ultimate reliance placed on
the intent exception, at the outS'et of the opinion the court of special appeals
formulated the issue to be decided in a somewhat bizarre fashion. stating: "The
primary question to be answered here is whether the shooting of a 'common
law' wife by a one-armed man twice within five years could constitute a 'plan or
scheme' to maim her." 35 Md. App. at 62. 368 A.2d at 1081.
10. E.g .. Cross v. State. 282 Md. 468. 386 A.2d 757 119781 lin a burglary
prosecution. the state attempted to identify the defendant through his vehicle
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common scheme. II Additionally, Maryland courts recognize three
other exceptions that are often overlooked: 12 res gestae,t3 handiwork
or signature,14 and sex crimes. 15

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

registration tag number which was allegedly obtained as the defendant fled the
scene of another burglary he supposedly committed an hour later; evidence
inadmissible because defendant's participation in the second burglary not
clearly established.); Mollar v. State, 25 Md. App. 291, 333 A.2d 625 (1975)
<Defendant related his past criminal record to his rape victim; record of his past
crimes admissible to identify defendant.>.
E.g., Avery v. State, 15 Md. App. 520, 292 A.2d 728 (1972) (In a prosecution for
assault and attempted rape in which the defendant, a doctor, gave the victim an
injection to render her unconscious before molesting her, evidence that he had
earlier perpetrated the same crime against the same victim in the same fashion
held admissible as constituting a common scheme of sexual gratification.), cert.
denied, 410 U.S. 977 (1973); Douglas v. State, 9 Md. App. 647, 267 A.2d 291
(1970) (In a robbery prosecution, testimony that the defendant contemporaneously robbed the victim's supervisor admissible as constituting a common
scheme.).
One could argue that both Avery and Douglas reached the right result for
the wrong reason. Specifically, it would appear that in Avery the court should
have relied upon the handiwork/signature or sex crimes exceptions, discussed
infra at text accompanying notes 82-92 and 59-63 respectively, in admitting
the evidence of the other crimes. Similarly, the Douglas court could better have
relied upon the res gestae exception, discussed in text accompanying notes
102-08 infra, in admitting the evidence of the contemporaneous robbery. In
any event, the Douglas decision as to the admissibility of the other robbery
constituted dictum because defense counsel had failed to preserve the point for
appeal. Id. at 651, 267 A.2d at 293.
The confusion exhibited in the Avery and Douglas decisions typifies the
ordinary judicial approach in Maryland to the admissibility of other crimes. In
essence, courts frequently confuse the exceptions with each other, a phenomenon which inures to the benefit of neither the state nor the defendant. For a
detailed discussion of the problem, and a possible solution, see text accompanying notes 135-58 infra.
The three additional exceptions are probably forgotten because the courts
frequently emphasize the exceptions that comprise the "MIMIC" mnemonic,
discussed at note 6 supra. In this light, consider the quotation attributed to an
assistant state's attorney in Martin v. State, 40 Md. App. 248, 389 A.2d 1374
(1978). The case reports a colloquy between the court and the prosecutor who
said: "That there is an abundance of case law in the State of Maryland and in
the legal treatises that indicate [sic) that evidence of another crime is
admissible. If it falls within one of the five exceptions to the general rule, such
evidence is then admissible." [d. at 250, 398 A.2d at 1375 (emphasis added).
E.g., Tull v. State, 230 Md. 596, 188 A.2d 150 (1963) <During a domestic
disturbance, the defendant first shot his father-in-law and then his wife; the
evidence as to the father-in-law was admissible in the trill I for the murder of
the wife under the res gestae exception.>.
E.g., McKnight v. State, 280 Md. 604, 375 A.2d 551 (1977) (In a trial for robbery
accomplished by yoking the victim, that is, grabbing him from behind and
choking him with one hand while rifling his pockets with the other, evidence
that the defendant had committed other yokings not admissible under the
handiwork exception because the modus operandi used by the defendant was
not sufficiently distinctive.>; Ellerba v. State, 41 Md. App. 712, 398 A.2d 1250
(1979) (In a trial for arson, testimony as to another arson committed by the
defendant inadmissible under the handiwork exception because the defendant
allegedly used two different methods to set the fires.l.
E.g., Wentz v. State, 159 Md. 161, 150 A. 278 (1930) (In an incest prosecution.
the trial court admitted evidence that the defendant had had intercourse with
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Commentators often remark that the numerous exceptions
threaten to swallow the general rule of exclusion. IS This situation
creates confusion as to the admissibility of other crimes in specific
instances, and causes reversals that could have been avoided if
prosecutors and trial courts had clearer guidelines to followY The
practicing attorney's problem is compounded in that most older
opinions merely refer to some or all of the exceptions mentioned
above without applying them to the facts. IS Recent Maryland
decisions, however, do not analyze the other crimes situations solely
in terms of the general rule and its exceptions. Instead, these later
decisions employ a two-step process. The courts first determine
whether the evidence fits into one or more of the exceptions, and
second balance the prejudicial effect of that evidence against its
probative value. 19 Through this process the defendant obtains greater
guarantees of fairness. 2o
As a result of the numerous exceptions to the rule of exclusion,
and the varied approaches to its application, the process of determining whether a specific factual situation authorizes the use of other
crimes evidence has become increasingly difficult. This comment
examines the exceptions to the general exclusionary rule,21 and
explores the inadequacies of the Maryland approach. Finally, an
elementary change with regard to the admissibility of other crimes
evidence is recommended in an attempt to eliminate the current
state of confusion.

16.
17.
18.

19.

20.
21.

another of his daughters; evidence was improperly admitted because the
testimony did not concern the same victim as the subject of the prosecution.).
E.g., Annot., 42 A.L.R.2d 854 (1955); Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 817 (1955); Annot., 15
A.L.R.2d 1080 (1951). All of these annotations contain this general assertion.
See, e.g., State v. Jones, 284 Md. 232,395 A.2d 1182 (1979) (string of successive
robberies held not to demonstrate a common scheme because all resulted from
separate decisions to rob someone).
E.g., Pinkett v. State, 30 Md. App. 458, 352 A.2d 358 (1976); Polisher v. State,
11 Md. App. 555, 276 A.2d 102, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971); Dyson v.
State, 6 Md. App. 453, 251 A.2d 606 (969),
This failure to perform any factual analysis has been criticized by the court
of appeals as being particularly unhelpful. Ross v. State, 276 Md. 664, 670, 350
A.2d 680, 685 (1976),
E.g., Worthen v. State, 42 Md. App. 20,399 A.2d 272 (1979) (While no existing
exception was specifically discussed, trial court's admission of a purported prior
offense was inadmissible because of its highly prejudicial and inflammatory
effect.>.
See notes 113-25 and accompanying text infra.
This comment does not purport to examine or analyze the Maryland law
pertaining to issues of entrapment or impeachment which also involve the
admissibility of other crimes evidence.
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II. EXCEPTIONS TO THE GENERAL RULE
OF EXCLUSION
A. Exceptions Dealing with Mental State: Motive, Intent, Absence of
Mistake, and Sex Crimes
The motive exception to the general rule of exclusion, which the
cases usually discuss first, provides that if another crime illustrates
the motive behind the crime with which the defendant is charged,
the court should admit the commission of the other crime into
evidence. This is illustrated by Brown v. State. 22 In Brown, the
defendant killed a police officer who was arresting him for uttering a
worthless check. The Court of Appeals of Maryland upheld the trial
court's admission of evidence that the defendant had uttered other
worthless checks on the basis that the homicide was actuated by
Brown's desire to escape prosecution for his prior criminal activity.23
Some Maryland courts that rely on· the motive exception to
admit evidence of other crimes effectively add another level to their
analyses. In Roberts v. State,24 the court of appeals affirmed an
assault and battery conviction in which the trial court had admitted
evidence of a prior theft involving the same defendant and victim.
Testimony elicited at trial demonstrated that the defendant had
received a jail sentence for the previous crime of larceny as a result
of the victim's account of the incident. That testimony precipitated a
motive of revenge, which caused the defendant to assault the victim.
Thus in Roberts, the court broadened the motive exception to include
not only the other crimes evidence, but its attendant circumstances
as well.
Additionally, other cases admitting or excluding evidence of
other crimes do so on the basis of more general motives such as
hatred,25 or broadly based criminal activity such as narcotics
involvement. 26 This has resulted in a myriad of situations to which

22. 220 Md. 29, 150 A.2d 895 <1959l.
23. Id. at 37, 150 A.2d at 899. See also Veney v. State, 251 Md. 182, 246 A.2d 568
(1968) (Police sergeant was shot and killed on Christmas Day by an individual
whom the sergeant attempted to arrest for a hold-up; evidence of the hold-up
admissible at the trial of defendant for the sergeant's murder.), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 948 (1969).
.
24. 219 Md. 485, 150 A.2d 448 (1959).
25. See, e.g., Lowery v. State, 202 Md. 314, 96 A.2d 20 (1953) (Defendant raped
sister-in-law to show hatred for wife; testimony of defendant's threatening
phone calls to wife admitted at trial for the rape.).
26. See, e.g., Harrison v. State, 276 Md. 122, 345 A.2d 830 (1975) (in a homicide
trial, marijuana found on defendant's person twenty days after the crime was
erroneously admitted. The proof at trial did not show defendant to be a hit man
or enforcer or otherwise connected with organized narcotics trafficking in such
a way as to explain the motive for the murder.).
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the motive exception could readily be envisioned to apply. Regardless
of the fact patterns to which Maryland courts apply the motive
exception, it suffers from the fundamental defect that no case
actually defines the exception. In fact, no case relying on it specifies
the meaning of the term "motive."27 More importantly, no opinion
distinguishes the motive exception from other qualifications to the
general rule of exclusion. For example, many cases confuse the
motive exception with common scheme,28 an entirely separate
qualification to the rule. These decisions indicate that there is a
"connection between the different transactions as raises a fair
inference of a common motive in each."29 If two different crimes
actually represent different aspects of a single criminal design, they
are parts of a common scheme directed toward a single illegal
purpose despite the semantic accuracy of declaring that the same
motive actuated them.
Most commonly the cases fail to distinguish between motive and
intent. Although such differentiation is possible,30 numerous Maryland cases use the terms interchangeably.3l Not surprisingly, therefore, a recent Maryland case referred to a trial court's jury
instruction that used the two words synonymously as "commendable."32 This imprecise terminology could- conceivably engender a

27. But see Martin v. State, 40 Md. App. 248, 389 A.2d 1374 (19781. The Martin
court states: "[M]otive is. . . that which would appear to cause or produce the
emotion that would in turn provoke or incite the commission of the criminal
offense." [d. at 252 n.2, 389 A.2d at 1376 n.2 (quoting Rodriguez v. State, 486
S.w.2d 355 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972».
Martin, however, neither adopted nor implicitly approved this definition. In
fact, the court of special appeals merely pointed out the confusion accompanying the designation of particular mental states as motive. Indeed the court
hinted that employment of the term in any context might best be avoided. [d.
28. See, e.g., Meno v. State, 117 Md. 435, 83 A. 759 (1912) (abortionist's behavior
indicated consistent utilization of the same ploy I.
29. Hunter v. State, 193 Md. 596,601,69 A.2d 505, 507 (1949); Purviance v. State,
185 Md. 189, 196,44 A.2d 474, 477 (19451. Both these cases involved gambling
violations in which the defendants consistently used the same methods to
commit their crimes.
30. See, e.g., 1 F. WHARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENC~; ~ 170 (Torcia ed. 19721. "Motive and
intent are not synonymous. Motive is the inducing cause, while intent is the
mental state with which the criminal act is committed." [d. 170.
31. E.g., Presley v. State, 224 Md. 550, 168 A.2d 510 (1961l, cert. denied, 368 U.S.
957 (1962); Bryant v. State, 207 Md. 565, 115 A.2d 502 (1955); Jones v. State.
182 Md. 653, 35 A.2d 916 (19441.
32. Chandler v. State, 23 Md. App. 645. 651. 329 A.2d 430. 433 (19741. The
instruction in relevant part stated:
So, therefore, you are advised to consider testimony which I have
admitted of other offenses. that is. these other times when allegedly the
Defendant attacked his wife. with respect to the crime that the
Defendant is on trial for in these proceedings. to the extent. and only to
the extent. that it tends to establish a motive or an intent . . . . Where

*
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situation in which courts unwittingly would admit evidence merely
demonstrative of criminal propensity simply because they are unable
to determine whether such evidence fits into any particular exception. Nevertheless, the decision of Martin v. State suggests that the
judiciary must soon formulate a clear meaning of the motive
exception, and that the trial courts may not admit motive evidence
unless it is necessary for the prosecution to prove its case. 33 This
notion meshes comfortably with the current policy of balancing
probative value against prejudicial effect/4 and with the idea that
the intent exception applies only when intent is material to the
case. 35
The most basic statement of the intent exception is that
"evidence of similar offenses is admissible when relevant to establish
intent."36 For instance, a defendant's prior batteries of a victim would
tend to foreclose the suggestion of horseplay if the situation were to
occur again. Similarly, a defendant's prior shopliftings could negate
the possibly neutral or even innocent interpretation most observers
would place on the removal of merchandise from its place of display
to another area of a store.
Despite the apparent simplicity of the intent exception, courts
relying on it often confuse it with other exceptions. Aside from the
previously noted fact that courts often equate intent with motive,37
some authority also tends to view the intent and res gestae
exceptions as identicaJ.38 In addition, the common scheme exception
appears to act as a surrogate for intent on occasion,39 and some
judicial writings indicate that intent and absence of mistake or
accident are but opposite sides of the same coin.40
Although the intent exception suffers from a lack of definition, it
has been used numerous times in Maryland to admit or exclude

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

38.
39.
40.

intent is material, the conduct of the accused is relevant to show that
intent.
[d. at 650-51, 329 A.2d at 433.
To muddy the waters further, earlier in the Chandler opinion, the court of
special appeals stated "that the admission of this evidence barely passed muster
as being within the 'motive' exception to the rule." [d. at 650, 329 A.2d at 433.
Martin v. State, 40 Md. App. 248, 255, 389 A.2d 1374, 1377 (1978).
See notes 113-25 and accompanying text infra.
See, e.g., Bryant v. State, 207 Md. 565, 115 A.2d 502 (1955); Simms v. State, 39
Md. App. 658, 388 A.2d 141 (1978).
Simms v. State, 39 Md. App. 658, 670, 388 A.2d 141, 147-48 (1978).
See, e.g., Presley v. State, 224 Md. 550, 168 A.2d 510 (1961), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 957 (1962),
See, e.g., Tull v. State, 230 Md. 596, 188 A.2d 150 (1963).
See, e.g., Westcoat v. State, 231 Md. 364, 190 A.2d 544 (1963).
E.g., Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.s. 463 (1976); Hoes v. State, 35 Md. App. 61,
368 A.2d 1080 (1977) !Defendant claimed mistake in shooting his paramour;
case decided on basis of intent.).
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evidence. 41 For instance, the intent qualification almost invariably
appears in instances involving either white collar42 or victimless 43
crimes. 44 Additionally, intent frequently refers to guilty knowledge. 45
Further, the intent exception often appears in cases requiring proof
of specific intent.46 The intent exception occasionally refutes defenses
of mistake or accident. 47 Several courts, however, have stated that

41. E.g., Ross v. State, 276 Md. 664, 350 A.2d 680 (1976) (prosecutor attempted to
use defendant's illegal transactions with informant dating back fifteen years to
show intent to distribute narcotics); Bryant v. State, 207 Md. 565, 115 A.2d 502
(1955) (defendant's prior assaults on his girlfriend used to show he intended to
kill her); Laws v. State, 6 Md. App. 243, 251 A.2d 237 (1961) (Prior robbery and
shooting admissible in kidnapping trial to demonstrate intent. No analysis
beyond this.).
42. E.g., Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976) (in a prosecution of an
attorney for false pretense accomplished by misrepresentations as to the state
of a title to real property, evidence of similar instances of deceit involving land
admissible to show intent); Levy v. State, 225 Md. 201, 170 A.2d 216 (in a
forgery prosecution, testimony that the defendant had uttered other forged
checks apparently admissible to show fraudulent intent), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
865 (1961); Kain v. State, 222 Md. 511, 161 A.2d 454 (in a receiving stolen
goods prosecution, testimony of two youths concerning transactions with the
defendant in which no agreement concerning the price of stolen articles could
be reached admissible to show guilty knowledge), cert. denied. 364 U.s. 874
(1960); Gordon v. State, 5 Md. App. 291, 246 A.2d 623 (1968) (in a prosecution
of attorney for embezzling client's funds from escrow, testimony of two other
attorneys detailing defendant's admissions of other thefts from escrow admissible as demonstrative of intentl.
43. E.g .• Ross v. State, 276 Md. 664, 350 A.2d 680 (1976) (in a narcotics prosecution,
testimony of informant as to his dealings with the defendant over fifteen years
held inadmissible under the intent exception); Meno v. State, 117 Md. 435, 83
A. 759 (1912) (In an abortion prosecution, statement of a witness that
defendant stated that he had performed similar operations on other girls was
inadmissible under the intent exception.).
44. But cf Douglas v. State, 9 Md. App. 647, 267 A.2d 291 (1970) (in a robbery
prosecution, evidence that defendant had robbed another victim at the same
time admissible as showing an intent to rob); Dyson v. State, 6 Md. App. 453,
251 A.2d 606 (1969) (in a prosecution for murder and child abuse, photographs
showing prior abuse of the victim admissible as showing intent>.
45. E.g., Kain v. State, 222 Md. 511, 161 A.2d 454 (receiving stolen goods), cert.
denied, 364 U.S. 874 (1960); Gordon v. State, 5 Md. App. 291, 246 A.2d 623
(1968) (embezzlementl. In both these cases the court specifically referred to
guilty knowledge.
46. E.g .• Ross v. State, 276 Md. 664,350 A.2d 680 (1976) (while the prosecution was
for possession of narcotics with intent to distribute, an informant's testimony of
fifteen-year-old dealings with the defendant did not establish the requisite
specific intent); Hoes v. State, 35 Md. App. 61, 368 A.2d 1080 (1977) (in a
prosecution for assault with intent to maim, evidence adduced at the trial
showing that the defendant had previously shot the victim admissible to
establish the requisite specific intent>.
47. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976) (evidence that defendant had
committed similar acts of false pretense admissible to show a lack of
inadvertence and the intent to defraud).
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the exception only applies when intent is material to the case. 4B
Nevertheless, as recently as 1976, the Court of Appeals of Maryland
specifically criticized other courts for failing to refer to particular
facts when applying the exception. 49
The intent exception contains another possibly confusing aspect.
In MacEwen v. State,50 the Court of Appeals of Maryland stated:
In the trial of a misdemeanor (and false pretenses is a
misdemeanor) every element necessary to constitute the
crime must be proved as a fact, and after the state, in a trial
of a misdemeanor has made out a prima facie case of guilt of
the crime charged, it may offer evidence, if relevant to the
question of intent, that the [defendant] committed other acts
of false pretense . . . .51
From this statement it would appear that in misdemeanor trials the
state must make out its case before it may use the intent exception.
The defendant in Polisher v. State 52 raised that contention, but the
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland referred to MacEwen and noted
that "this does not mean that the State must first establish prima
facie every element of the crime charged, for it is the evidence of
other offenses which may prove some of the elements of the crime
charged."53 It thus appears that the prosecution may rely upon the
intent exception to help construct a prima facie case. Under this
formulation, a prosecutor could use the exception to demonstrate
intent itself in an appropriate situation. For example, dishonest
entrepreneurs who consistently swindle their customers could claim
a simple misunderstanding if juries were permitted to consider only
one fraudulent transaction at a time.

48. See, e.g., Bryant v. State, 207 Md. 565, 115 A.2d 502 (1955) (when the defendant
killed his girlfriend and later testified that the shooting was accidental, the
court held that evidence of two previous assaults upon the victim by the
defendant was admissible under the intent exception); Simms v. State, 39 Md.
App. 658, 388 A.2d 141 (1978) (in a felony murder prosecution in which the
state's theory was that the defendant murdered the victim during an assault
with intent to rape, evidence that the defendant had raped another victim and
had assaulted another with the intent to rape admissible under the intent
exception).
49. Ross v. State, 276 Md. 664, 350 A.2d 680 (1976>. The Ross case states, "[T]he
court in each merely approved the admission into evidence of prior narcotics
transactions under the 'intent' exception to the general rule, stating the
proposition virtually in the abstract without any reference to the necessary
facts." [d. at 670, 350 A.2d at 685.
50. 194 Md. 492, 71 A.2d 464 (1950).
51. [d. at 501-02, 71 A.2d 468.
52. 11 Md. App. 555, 276 A.2d 102 (false pretense; defendant auto repairman
repeatedly charged customers for work he and his subordinates never did), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971).
53. [d. at 585, 276 A.2d at 117 (emphasis in original).
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Additionally, the new Maryland theft statute contains what is
tantamount to an intent exception. 54 Article 27, section 342(c) of the
Maryland Annotated Code, which prohibits the crime formerly
denominated receiving stolen goods, requires for a finding of guilt
that the defendant obtain the property with either knowledge that it
has been stolen or a belief that it probably has been stolen. 55 The
statute eases the prosecution's burden when merchants are accused.
Under the new statute the requisite knowledge may be inferred from
the businessman's having been found with stolen property on at least
two prior occasions, or from his acquisition of stolen property in a
separate transaction in the year preceeding the possession charged. 56
Consequently, this provision aids the demonstration of intent or
perhaps absence of mistake.
An exception to the general rule of exclusion of other crimes
which is frequently overlooked by the courts involves the absence of
mistake or accident. 57 Although no Maryland court relies exclusively
upon the exception, it probably applies to the type of situation in
which one who puts fungible property down temporarily has it stolen
by another. An independent witness could interpret the occurrence in
two ways: either that the second individual inadvertently picked up
the wrong property, believing it was his; or that he simply stole it. If
the jury were to examine these facts without any frame of reference,
it would never find the second person guilty of theft. If, however,
after the thief alleged mistake, the prosecution could demonstrate
that he had done the same thing five times in the past, the
possibilities of showing the occurrence of a criminal act and of
obtaining a conviction greatly increase.
Unfortunately, no Maryland decision places an exclusive reliance upon absence of mistake or accident when admitting evidence
of other crimes. Instead, the courts merely include the exception
along with several others when they attempt to apply it.58 Logic
would seem to dictate that the exception should only apply to
situations in which the prosecution must show the other crimes in
order to refute a defendant's allegation of mistake or accident.
Unless the exception is utilized in this manner prosecutors could
unfairly and unduly prejudice a defendant by bringing up sordid
details of his past before he even has a chance to put on his case.
The most troublesome exception to the rule of exclusion of other
crimes is the sex crimes exception. In its simplest form, this

MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, ~~ 340-345 (Supp. 1979).
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, ~ 342(c) (Supp. 1979).
[d. ~ 342(c)(2)(i) & (ij).
E.g., Gordon v. State, 5 Md. App. 291. 246 A.2d 623 11968); Thomas v. State, 3
Md. App. 708, 240 A.2d 646 11968).
58. See, e.g., Gordon v. State, 5 Md. App. 291. 246 A.2d 623 11968).

54.
55.
56.
57.

1980]

Evidence of Other Crimes

255

qualification states that evidence of prior sexual offenses with the
same victim is admissible to demonstrate the accused's propensity
toward and passion for illegal sexual relations with that person. 59
Indeed, several Maryland opinions go to some length to explain that
the prosecution may show predisposition toward illicit sexual
activities with the victim but not with anyone else. 60
Under the sex crimes exception if a divorced husband were
charged with raping his former wife, the prosecution could conceivably buttress the case against the defendant by proving that the two
had engaged in so-called perverted sexual activities with each other
while they were still married. The admission of other crimes under
such circumstances contravenes the premise underlying the exclusionary rule that prosecutors may not introduce evidence of other
crimes merely to show propensity or disposition. 61 In effect the sex
crimes exception represents an anachronistic and irrational reaction
to "degenerate" offenders. 62 Evidence of an individual's past attacks
on the same victim constitutes appropriate fare for a judicial
determination of what sentence to impose, not guilt or innocence. If
this is so, it would appear that the Maryland courts should seriously
consider eliminating the sex crimes exception. Indeed, such a step
would seem to be mandated in the absence of any compelling
contemporary justification for the retention of what is most probably
an outmoded legal principle steeped in emotionalism and unnecessary for the protection of society. 63

59. Wethington v. State, 3 Md. App. 237, 238 A.2d 581 (1968) (indecent exposure).
See also Annot., 167 A.L.R. 565 (1947).
60. E.g., Wentz v. State, 159 Md. 161, 150 A. 278 (1930); Wethington v. State, 3 Md.
App. 237, 238 A.2d 581 (1968),
61. Accord, Note, 46 TuL. L. REV. 336 <1971}. In assessing the sex crimes exception,
this article states, "In short, highly inflammatory evidence of questionable
probative value has been forced into an enumerated exception. The net effect is
to allow the introduction of the very evidence the rule of exclusion was designed
to prohibit - the bad character of the accused." [d. at 340.
62. Trautman, Logical or Legal Relevancy, A Conflict in Theory, 5 VAND. L. REV.
385 (1952). Trautman states that, "Because of the increasing belief that sexual
psychopaths have a disposition to repeat their acts of aggression, the probative
value of evidence of other such offenses is considered to be so high that some
courts are beginning to question even the narrow rule of absolute exclusion."
[d. at 406 (emphasis added). The article also lists studies which purport to
demonstrate the recidivistic tendencies of the sex offender. [d. at 406 n.83.
63. Some contemporary research demonstrates that society may have less to fear
from sex offenders than from other types of criminals. Slough & Knightly,
Other Vices, Other Crimes, 41 IOWA L. REV. 325, 332-34 (1956>. Furthermore,
current medical research appears to debunk many of the myths about sex
offenders. See Note, 46 TUL. L. REV. 336, 342 nn.44-47 (1971).
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B. Exceptions Predicated on Factual Considerations: Identity,
Handiwork or Signature, Common Scheme,
and Res Gestae
In Maryland, evidence of other crimes is admissible if it
identifies the defendant as the perpetrator of the offense charged. 64
For example, if a defendant were to provide a victim with an account
of his past criminal exploits, such as by warning a hold-up target
that he had killed a resisting grocer several years before, the courts
would admit that testimony of the earlier crime in an attempt to
identify the accused. Although a factual situation of this nature
would seem to occur with relative frequency, until 1975 no Maryland
court had examined the identity exception carefully.65 In fact, a 1978
Court of Appeals of Mary land opinion decried this dearth of prior
analysis. 66
Currently, the identity exception is surrounded by sufficient
controversy to require serious judicial scrutiny. Professor McCormick
initiated the confusion when he wrote that "identity . . . evidence
will usually follow, as an intermediate channel, some one or more of
the other [exceptions]."67 The Fourth Circuit construed this statement to mean that "the identity exception is not really an exception
in its own right, but rather is spoken of as a supplementary purpose
of another exception."68
This analysis was considered by the court of special appeals in
Mollar v. State. 69 In that case a rapist regaled his victim with stories
of his past criminal exploits and his talent for being arrested and
incarcerated. 70 In fact, the defendant gave the victim such a detailed
version of his criminal history that the prosecution used it to identify
him, a fact that eliminated the problem of the victim's earlier
identification of someone else.71 In holding that the identity exception has an existence separate from any of its brethren, the court
reasoned that "to hold otherwise would render the identity exception
a purposeless existence."72
Even though the Mollar case apparently clarified matters, the
identity exception continued to create problems. In Cross v. State,73
64. See, e.g., MoHar v. State, 25 Md. App. 291, 333 A.2d 625 (1975); Smithson v.
State, 5 Md. App. 378, 247 A.2d 542 (1968).
65. MoHar v. State, 25 Md. App. 291, 333 A.2d 625 (1975), first subjected the
identity exception to close examination in Maryland.
66. Cross v. State, 282 Md. 468, 476, 386 A.2d 757, 763 (1978).
67. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 190 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK].
68. United States v. Woods, 484 F.2d 127, 134 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.s.
979 (1974),
69. 25 Md. App. 291, 333 A.2d 625 <1975l.
70. Id. at 295, 333 A.2d at 627.
71. Id. at 296-97, 333 A.2d at 629.
72. Id. at 294, 333 A.2d at 627.
73. 282 Md. 468, 386 A.2d 757 (1978).
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the court of appeals, without mentioning Mollar, focused on the same
passage of McCormick quoted earlier as confusing. 74 To address the
McCormick proposition, the court resorted to yet another treatise,
written by Underhill. This work divided the identity exception into
ten sub-exceptions. 75 The court applauded this "analysis" as "most
useful,"76 and included all ten sub-exceptions in the body of the
opinion.77 The court ultimately did not use this "most useful
analysis," however, because the decision excluded the other crimes
evidence on entirely different grounds. 7s Nonetheless, in Simms v.
State,79 a murder prosecution decided four months after Cross, the
court of special appeals set out Underhill's ten sub-divisions of the
identity exception and upheld the admission of other crimes on the
basis of the sub-exception referring to ballistics evidence. so The
problem with this approach is that it more closely resembles the
resolution of a multiple choice examination than legal analysis.
Furthermore, the Underhill sub-exception that pertains to modus
operandi more accurately refers to the handiwork or signature
exception to the rule of exclusion. sl
74. MCCORMICK, supra" note 67, § 190.
75. 1 H. UNDERHILL, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 210 (Herrick ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited
as UNDERHILL]. Underhill lists the exceptions as follows:
[E]vidence of other offenses may be received if it shows:
(a) the defendant's presence at the scene or in the locality of the
crime on trial;
(b) that the defendant was a member of an organization whose
purpose was to commit crimes similar to the one on trial;
(c) the defendant's identity from a handwriting exemplar, "mug
shot," or fingerprint record from a prior arrest;
(d) the defendant's identity from a remark made by him;
(e) the defendant's prior theft of a gun, car or other object used in
the offense on trial;
(f) that the defendant was found in possession of articles taken
from the victim of the crime on trial;
(g) that the defendant had on another occasion used the same
alias or the same confederate as was used by the perpetrator of the
present crime;
(h) that a peculiar modus operandi used by the defendant on
another occasion was used by the perpetrator of the crime on trial;
(i) that on another occasion the defendant was wearing the
clothing worn by or was using certain objects used by the perpetrator of
the crime at the time it was committed;
(j) that the witness' view of the defendant at the other crime
enabled him to identify the defendant as the person who committed the
crime on trial.
[d. § 210. Additionally, the treatise recently supplemented sub-exception (c) as
follows: "or his identity through a ballistics "test." [d. § 210 (Herrick ed. Supp.
1978).
76. Cross v. State, 282 Md. 468, 477, 386 A.2d 757, 763 (1978).
77. [d. at 477-78,386 A.2d at 763.
78. [d. at 478-79,386 A.2d at 764 (evidence excluded because the proof of the other
crimes was not clear and convincing).
79. 39 Md. App. 658, 388 A.2d 141 (1978),
80. [d. at 664, 388 A.2d at 145.
81. Cross v. State, 282 Md. 468, 477 n.6, 386 A.2d 757, 763 n.6 (1978),
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The handiwork or signature exception posits that evidence of
other crimes is admissible "to prove other crimes by the accused so
nearly identical as to earmark them as the handiwork of the
accused."82 This exception is best illustrated by the burglar who left a
bathroom scale by the front door of each residence he broke into so
that he could weigh the silver he stole. The thieCs method was so
distinctive that it became as unique as his signature. Under the
handiwork or signature exception, if the burglar were apprehended
later, while using the same ploy, evidence of the utilization of that
method in anyone crime would normally be admissible in a trial for
any other.
While the handiwork exception appears simple in theory, it
presents difficulties in application. The modus operandi employed by
the defendant "must be so unusual and distinctive as to be like a
signature."83 While the techniques employed must resemble each
other,84 they cannot be of a sort which "fit into an obvious tactical
pattern which . . . anyone disposed to commit a depredation of the
sort for which the defendant is on trial [would useJ."85 Some
prosecutors and lower courts fail to recognize this fact. This results
in reversals of convictions obtained by evidence of other crimes
which was improperly admitted under the handiwork qualification.86
Courts also confuse the handiwork and common scheme exceptions. 87
For instance, situations arise in which an individual uses the same
method repeatedly to perpetrate a particular type of crime. A
physician might drug a female patient so that he could rape her.88 A
gambler might use the same bookkeeping methodology.89 Yet, as

82. Brafman v. State, 38 Md. App. 465, 472, 381 A.2d 687, 691 (1978) (quoting
MCCORMICK, supra note 67, at 190).
83. Id. at 473, 381 A.2d at 691 (quoting MCCORMICK, supra note 67, at 190).
84. Compare Ellerba v. State, 41 Md. App. 712, 398 A.2d 1250 (1979) (evidence of
separate arsons inadmissible at trial for one of them because means employed
to set the fires differed) with Nasim v. State, 34 Md. App. 65, 366 A.2d 70
(1976) (evidence of separate arsons admissible at trial for one of them because
means employed to set the fires substantially similar), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
868 (1977).
85. Drew v. United States, 331 F.2d 85, 93 m.c. Cir. 1964), quoted in United States
v. Foutz, 540 F.2d 733 (4th Cir. 1976); Lebedun v. State, 283 Md. 257,390 A.2d
64 (1978); McKnight v. State, 280 Md. 604, 375 A.2d 551 (1977).
86. E.g., Lebedun v. State, 283 Md. 257, 390 A.2d 64 (1978); McKnight v. State, 280
Md. 604, 375 A.2d 551 (1977).
87. See, e.g., Cole v. State, 232 Md. 111, 194 A.2d 278 (1963) (similar modus
operandi in cashing checks), cert. denied. 375 U.s. 980 (1964); Greenwald v.
State, 221 Md. 245, 157 A.2d 119 (same modus operandi used by doctor issuing
false certificates of pregnancy to facilitate circumvention of statutory age
restrictions on marriage). appeal dismissed. 363 U.S. 721 (1960).
88. E.g., Avery v. State, 15 Md. App. 520. 292 A.2d 728 (1972). cert. denied. 410
U.S. 977 (19731.
89. E.g .. Purviance v. State. 185 Md. 189. 44 A.2d 474 (1945).

*
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Lebedun v. Stat~O notes, "A method of operation is oot, by itself, a
common scheme, but merely a repetitive pattern."91
Despite Lebedun, however, a recent court of special appeals
decision appears to admit handiwork evidence under the banner of
common scheme in a situation in which jail inmates who were
attempting to escape used the same method to smuggle a handgun
into the institution as they had earlier used to procure illegal
narcotics. 92 If the escape attempt and narcotics smuggling were
clearly separate and unconnected crimes, logically they could not
constitute parts of the same scheme. The fact that criminals applied
the same ingenious stratagem to different kinds of crimes merely
indicated the adaptability of the ploy, not the existence of an
ultimate criminal purpose. Admission of such a modus operandi
under the common scheme exception only confuses the issue.
Maryland courts permit evidence of other crimes to be introduced when it demonstrates a common scheme. 93 Maryland courts
have frequently relied on this qualification to guide their rulings as
to various questions of admissibility.94 Generally the exception arises
in situations in which criminals commit several crimes to accomplish
a single illegal purpose. For instance, the situation in which an
armed robber steals a car ahead of time to facilitate his escape from
the bank he robs illustrates a common scheme.
Two recent Maryland cases, State v. Jones 95 and Cross v. State,96
explain the common scheme exception in detail. As noted in Jones,
"[M]ere proximity in time and location within which several offenses
may be committed does not necessarily make one offense intertwine
with the others. Immediateness and site are not determinative. . . .
Nor does the fact that the offenses were committed by the same
persons qualify them . . . . "97 Rather, as stated in Cross, "there must
be not merely a similarity in the results, but such a concurrence of
90. 283 Md. 257, 390 A.2d 64 (1978).
91. Id. at 280, 390 A.2d at 75, <quoting Cross v. State, 282 Md. 468, 386 A.2d 757
(1978»).
92. Whitfield v. State, 42 Md. App. 107, 400 A.2d 772 (1979), rev'd on other
grounds, 287 Md. 124, 411 A.2d 415 (1980),
93. See, e.g., Mason v. State, 12 Md. App. 655, 280 A.2d 753 (1971),
94. E.g., Callahan v. State, 174 Md. 47,197 A. 589 (1938); Isaacs v. State, 31 Md.
App. 604, 358 A.2d 273 (1976); Avery v. State, 15 Md. App. 520, 292 A.2d 728
(1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 977 (1973); Douglas v. State, 9 Md. App. 647, 267
A.2d 291 (1970).
95. 284 Md. 232, 395 A.2d 1182 (1979).
96. 282 Md. 468, 386 A.2d 757 (1978).
97. State v. Jones, 284 Md. 232,243,395 A.2d 1182, 1188 (1979). In explaining the
common scheme exception earlier, the Jones court stated:
[T]o establish the existence of a common scheme or plan, it is necessary
to prove that the various acts constituting the offenses naturally relate
to one another by time, location, circumstances and parties so as to give
rise to the conclusion that they are several stages of a continuing
transaction.
Id. at 243, 395 A.2d at 1188.
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common features that the various acts are naturally to be explained
as caused by a general plan of which they are the individual
manifestations."98 In short, superficial concurrence or mere coincidence do not demonstrate a common scheme.
In addition to the confusion of common scheme and motive noted
earlier,99 courts often use the common scheme exception to admit
evidence that demonstrates the totality of circumstances surrounding the defendant's actions. If a thief pilfers a number of checks and
forges them at different locations to obtain money,IOO he is not
implementing a plan which has as its ultimate purpose one
fraudulent enrichment at the end. Nor are the thiefs actions so
unique as to qualify for handiwork or signature treatment.l0l Yet the
jury might only be able to comprehend the case against the thief if it
has an overview of all his actions. Here the res gestae exception, as
opposed to the common scheme exception, should apply.
The general proposition regarding the res gestae exception was
set forth in Wilson v. State. 102 "Evidence of declarations and acts
which are an immediate accompaniment of the act charged and so
closely connected with the main fact as to constitute a part of it, and
without which the main fact might not be properly understood, are
admissible as part of the res gestae."103 Essentially, courts will admit
the evidence of the other crimes if it helps the jury to understand the
whole picture with regard to the defendant's activities. Unlike the
court in Wilson, Maryland courts often apply this exception without
specifically mentioning the term "res gestae." This practice has
arisen in a variety of circumstances, including illegal abortion,I04
perverted practices,105 pandering,106 and the illegal sale of alcoholic
beverages. 107 None of these cases, however, discussed why the jury
needed to know the whole story to determine guilt of a specific crime.

98. Cross v. State, 282 Md. 468, 475, 386 A.2d 757, 762 (1978) (quoting 2 J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
410 (3d ed. 1940».
99. See text accompanying notes 28 & 29.
100. E.g., Ward v. State, 219 Md. 559, 150 A.2d 257 (1959); Thomas v. State, 3 Md.
App. 708, 240 A.2d 646 (1968).
101. For an analysis of the handiwork or signature exception, see the text
accompanying notes 82-92 supra.
102. 181 Md. 1, 26 A.2d 770 (1942).
103. [d. at 3, 26 A.2d at 772. See also Tull v. State, 230 Md. 596, 188 A.2d 150 (1963)
(defendant shot father-in-law and wife in family dispute).
104. Avery v. State, 121 Md. 229, 88 A. 148 (1913) (illegal abortions on several
different girls).
105. Blake v. State, 210 Md. 459, 124 A.2d 273 (1956) (act of sodomy contemporaneous with other perverted practices).
106. Mazer v. State, 231 Md. 40, 188 A.2d 552 (1963) (prostitute turned state's
witness in pandering case also testified about illegal "sitting" activities).
107. Mitchell v. State, 178 Md. 579, 16 A.2d 161 (1940) (essentially contemporaneous
illegal liquor sales).

*
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While a judge might require information regarding the total context
of the defendant's crimes in order to impose an appropriate sentence,
providing a jury with this information might well unduly prejudice
the defendant. loB

III. CONSIDERATIONS OF FAIRNESS
TO THE DEFENDANT
A.

Standard of Proof

Even if evidence of the other crimes that the defendant is
accused of committing falls within one or more of the exceptions
discussed above, the prosecution cannot automatically introduce it.
As a threshhold matter, the state must first prove that the accused in
fact committed the other crimes. The difficulty rests in the burden of
proof with respect to those crimes. The traditional criminal standard
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, however, creates unnecessary
difficulty for the prosecutor whose case preparation focuses on the
crime at bar. On the other hand, a standard of proof based on the
usual civil standard of mere preponderance could readily create
convictions supported by character assassination. To resolve this
dilemma, Maryland courts require that before the prosecution may
introduce any evidence of other crimes, it must first prove the
defendant's involvement in those crimes by clear and convincing
evidence,l09 a standard of proof falling between a reasonable doubt
108. With the decision in State v. Jones, 284 Md. 232, 395 A.2d 1182 (1979), one
might well question the viability of the res gestae exception. In Jones, the court
of appeals held inadmissible evidence of essentially contemporaneous robberies
committed by the defendant in a trial for a murder committed in the course of
still another robbery. Note, however, that Jones did not mention res gestae and
that each of the robberies involved an independent decision.
109. State v. Jones, 284 Md. 232, 395 A.2d 1182 (1979); Cross v. State, 282 Md. 468,
386 A.2d 757 (1978); Whitfield v. State, 42 Md. App. 107,400 A.2d 772 (1979),
rev'd on other grounds, 287 Md. 124, 411 A.2d 415 (1980).
The latest case concerning this issue, Offutt v. State, 44 Md. App. 670, 410
A.2d 611 (1980), contains the following statement: "We do not read Cross as
requiring that evidence of the other crime must be clear and convincing. The
only requirement is that the defendant's involvement be clear and convincing."
Id. at 675, 410 at 614. The court of special appeals drew this somewhat obscure
distinction because of the unusual facts of the case. In Offutt, a bungling hold-up
man handed employees of two separate businesses a note stating, "Give me call
your money." Id. at 671-73, 410 A.2d at 612-13. Because of the note's
incomprehensibility, neither of the employees took the defendant seriously at
first. Consequently, when the state introduced evidence of the second incident at
the defendant's trial for the first incident, the defendant objected on the ground
that the state had not proven the second crime by clear and convincing
evidence. Id. at 675, 410 A.2d at 614. In dismissing this contention, the court of
special appeals held that the state need only demonstrate the defendant's
involvement in the other crime by clear and convincing evidence, not the
occurrence of the other crime itself. Of course, had the defendant told the
employees to give him "all," rather than "call," their money this dilemma would
never have surfaced.
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and mere preponderance. The state may satisfy this requirement by
either circumstantial or direct evidence. 110
In light of Maryland's use of the clear and convincing standard,
acquittal of a prior offense does not necessarily preclude its
introduction at a later trial. The result of the original trial could
indicate nothing more than a technical failure of proof. Maryland
recognizes this situation and allows the introduction of other crimes
evidence despite an acquittal. 111 To insure fairness, however, the
defendant may prove any acquittal, and failure to allow him to do so
constitutes a denial of due process. 112

B. Balancing Probative Value Against Prejudicial Effect
As mentioned above,113 Maryland courts now employ a two-step
process in determining whether to admit evidence of other crimes.
Generally, judges have no difficulty in pigeonholing evidence of other
crimes into one or several of the exceptions.1I4 Yet there is a problem
with such categorization in that it has an enormous potential for
creating undue prejudice to the defendant. liS Recognizing this factor,
the more recent Maryland decisions require that before any information as to an accused's other crimes is admitted into evidence, it must
be subjected to rigid scrutiny.1I6 The prejudicial effect of evidence of
other crimes committed by a defendant must be weighed against its
probative value.117 This process has led to the utilization of a
balancing test which has been synthesized by Professor McCormick
as follows: liS
[S]ome of the wiser opinions (especially recent ones) recognize that the problem is not merely one of pigeonholing, but
one of balancing, on the one side, the actual need for the
other crimes evidence in light of the issues and the other
evidence available to the prosecution, the convincingness of
the evidence that the other crimes were committed and that

110. Cross v. State, 282 Md. 468, 386 A.2d 757 (1978).
111. Womble v. State, 8 Md. App. 119, 258 A.2d 786 (1969) (failure to allow post
conviction petitioner to prove acquittal amounted to denial of fair trial and due
process).
112. Id. at 126, 258 A.2d at 789.
113. See text accompanying notes 19 & 20 supra.
114. See Cross v. State, 282 Md. 468, 474, 386 A.2d 757, 761 <1978>.
115. United States v. Foutz, 540 F.2d 733 (4th Cir. 1976>. But see Womble v. State, 8
Md. App. 119, 258 A.2d 786 <1969>.
116. E.g., Ross v. State, 276 Md. 664, 350 A.2d 680 (1976); Berger v. State, 179 Md.
410,20 A.2d 146 (1941); Gorski v. State, 1 Md. App. 200. 228 A.2d 835 (1967).
117. E.g., Worthen v. State, 42 Md. App. 20, 399 A.2d 272 (1979) (not only was the
evidence excessively prejudicial. it also alluded to a sexual crime. which never
occurred. against an infantl.
118. MCCORMICK, supra note 67. 190.
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the accused was the actor, and the strength or weakness of
the other crimes evidence in supporting the issue, and on the
other, the degree to which the jury wlIf probably be roused
by the evidence to overmastering hostility. 119
Additionally, if the prosecution does not need a particular kind
of evidence to prove an element of its case, such as motive, the courts
automatically exclude the evidence as too prejudicial. 120 Although
Maryland courts have noted that certain cases have a greater
requirement for other crimes evidence because of the surreptitious
nature of the crime charged,121 the recent decision by the court of
appeals in Worthen v. State 122 effectively abolishes the proposition
that special categories of crimes should automatically receive more
lenient treatment. 123
Generally cases that focus on the impact of evidence of other
. crimes involve jury trials. Indeed, the McCormick multi-faceted
balancing test focuses on jury contamination. 124 Implicit in such a
formulation is the idea that a judge who sits as a trier of fact at a
court trial is not prejudicially influenced by erroneously admitted
evidence. Yet it strains logic to assert that a judge who commits a
good faith error in admitting evidence will not be influenced by it. In
fact there is some Maryland case authority that suggests that judges
too may be impermissibly influenced by evidence they erroneously
admit. 125
119. [d. § 190, quoted in Hoes v. State, 35 Md. App. 61, 368 A.2d 1080 (1977); Mollar
v. State, 25 Md. App. 291, 333 A.2d 625 (1975). Despite its inherent
awkwardness, "convincingness" is actually a word. 1 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTION·
ARY 548 (Compact ed. 1971).
120. Martin v. State, 40 Md. App. 248, 389 A.2d 1374 <1978>121. E.g., Nasim v. State, 34 Md. App. 65, 366 A.2d 70 (1976) (arson), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 868 (1977). One can also logically make the same assertion about most
cases of first degree murder, burglary, and a host of other crimes.
122. 42 Md. App. 20, 399 A.2d 272 <1979>123. [d. at 38, 399 A.2d at 283.
124. MCCORMICK, supra note 67, § 190. The Cross case underscores this, stating:
The preferred method for submitting any evidence of other crimes to the
court during trial would be by way of a proffer to the trial judge outside
the presence or hearing of the jury. Such a proffer not only protects the
jury from immediate prejudice, but also allows the trial judge to
determine whether there is any way to limit the prejudicial aspects of
evidence while retaining its probative character and whether the
evidence should be properly introduced at that time.
Cross v. State, 282 Md. 468, 478 n.7, 386 A.2d 757, 764 n.7 (19781.
125. See Dobbs v. State, 148 Md. 34, 129 A. 275 (1925) (Offutt, J., concurring) (three
judge trial panel erroneously admitted other crimes evidence I. See also United
States v. Hamrick, 293 F.2d 468 (4th Cir. 1961>. The Hamrick case relates the
following situation: "[Tlhe court requested and, over objection, received
Hamrick's past criminal record and read therefrom. The court observed: 'You
can tell more what kind of a snake you are dealing with if you can see his
color.''' [d. at 469. On a more whimsical note, H.L. Mencken once wrote:
Our rules of evidence, like our system of punishments, are full of
irrationalities. They exclude a great many pertinent facts, for example,
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Temporal Remoteness

A defendant's past criminal history, at some point in time,
becomes too remote to have any legitimate bearing on a current
case. 126 Even though the running of the statute of limitations as to
the other crimes offered as proof does not bar their admission,127 it
would appear that under some circumstances, the courts should hold
such evidence inadmissible as a matter of law. It is well settled in
Maryland, however, that remoteness affects the weight rather than
the admissibility of the evidence.128 Notwithstanding this general
principle, recent Maryland case law indicates that judicial thinking
in this regard is changing. In 1976, the court of special appeals noted
that a time lapse of six years renders proof of other crimes so remote
as to be almost devoid of evidentiary value. 129 A year later, the court
of special appeals implied that at some point the evidence will be so
remote as to be inadmissible. 130 In short, remoteness now has two

126.

127.
128.
129.
130.

what sort of man is accused of the crime, and what sort suffered from it.
The jury is supposed to hear and know nothing about the record of the
accused, which is not mentioned until he has been found guilty and the
judge is ready to sentence him. In Maryland, where persons charged
with crime, including even capital crime, may elect to be tried by a
judge or judges without a jury, this leads to frequent absurdities. The
judge usually knows quite well what the accused's record is, but he is
supposed to be ignorant of it until he has announced his verdict.
I long ago suggested that, in trials for murder or assault, it should
be competent for the defense· to introduce testimony showing the
character of the victim. Certainly it is absurd to inflict the same
punishment for killing or mauling a perfectly decent and innocent
person, and doing the same to a gunman or other professional ruffian. I
am willing to go further. That is, I am willing to admit evidence to show
that the victim, though perhaps not a criminal himself, was of such
small social value that his death or injury was no appreciable public
loss. But in this field the lawyers and judges cling to the idea of equality
before the law, though it has been cheerfully abandoned elsewhere, for
example, in the field of labor relations.
H. MENCKEN. MINORITY REPORT 5-6 (1956).
See generally Annot., 88 A.L.R.3d 8 (1978); Annot., 78 A.L.R.2d 1359 (1961);
Annot., 77 A.L.R.2d 841 (1961); Annot., 64 AL.R.2d 823 (1959); Annot., 42
AL.R.2d 854 (1955); Annot., 40 AL.R.2d 817 (1955); Annot., 34 AL.R.2d 777
(954); Annot., 167 A.L.R. 565 (947); Annot., 80 AL.R. 1306 (1932); Annot., 63
AL.R. 602 (1929).
Duncan v. State, 282 Md. 385, 384 A.2d 456 (1978) (dictum).
Purviance v. State, 185 Md. 189,44 A2d 474 (975) <evidence of the same type
of criminal activity a year earlier not barred on account of remoteness).
Gooch v. State, 34 Md. App. 331, 367 A.2d 90 (1976).
Hoes v. State, 35 Md. App. 61, 368 A2d 1080 (1977). Hoes states that, "[Tlhe
nature of the prior crime and the crime charged and the logical interrelationship of such crimes are the controlling factors in determining whether a
particular lapse of time is sufficiently substantial to make the prior crime too
remote." [d. at 70, 368 A.2d at 1086 <quoting 1 F. WHARTON, supra note 30, at
260). In a related area, note that the federal courts ordinarily impose a ten-year
time limit on convictions used to impeach a witness. FED. R. EVID. 609(b).
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separate but interrelated aspects. Defense counsel can first argue
inadmissibility as a matter of law. If that argument fails, the
advocate can later attempt to persuade the trier of fact that it should
not give such stale evidence much significance in determining guilt.

D. Severance
When a defendant is charged with more than one crime, the
state frequently attempts to join several of the alleged offenses at one
trial. If the trial of several charges at once would unduly prejudice
the defendant, for example by thwarting a strategic decision to
testify about one crime but not another, the court may order
severance of the various counts. 131
Often courts are called upon to resolve disputes involving
severance and the admissibility of evidence of other crimes together.
This circumstance is so prevalent that in 1977 the court of appeals
held: "A defendant charged with similar but unrelated offenses is
entitled to a severance where he establishes that the evidence as to
each individual offense would not be mutually admissible at separate
trials."132 Accordingly, while a prosecutor may try an individual for
several different offenses at once, if the state, at a trial for one crime,
could not admit evidence as to another it seeks to try at the same
time, the trial judge must sever the charges. In other words, if an
exception to the general rule of exclusion does not apply, or if it
applies but its prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value,
severance of the charges must result.
Maryland courts often use the same rationales in deciding
questions pertaining to severance and to admissibility of evidence of
other crimes. Judges excluding evidence of other crimes generally
are seeking to avoid confusing or prejudicing jurors, or confronting a
defendant with charges against which he is unprepared to defend. 133
Similarly, the joinder of similar offenses is disallowed because it may
embarrass or confound the defendant in presenting separate defenses; it may lead to such a cumulation of evidence as to create an
inference of guilt; it may increase latent hostility to the defendant; or
it may lead the jury to infer a criminal disposition on the part of the
131. Md. Rule 745(c). Additionally, note that Md. Rule 712, which refers to joinder of
offenses and defendants in the charging document, appears to sanction joinder
only when the offenses are of the same or similar character, part of the res
gestae, or part of a common scheme. Id. This latter rule, however, only governs
pleading and not the method by which the offenses are brought to trial. To
illustrate, the joinder for trial of crimes alleged in several separate charging
documents would not run afoul of Rule 712. It might, however, be improper
under Rule 745(c) and the judicial construction thereof.
132. McKnight v. State, 280 Md. 604, 612, 375 A.2d 551, 556 (1977>. The same
quotation also appears in State v. Jones, 284 Md. 232, 239, 395 A.2d 1182, 1186
(1979), and Ellerba v. State, 41 Md. App. 712, 729, 398 A.2d 1250, 1259 (1979),
133. E.g., Brafman v. State, 38 Md. App. 465, 381 A.2d 687 (1978) (rape).
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defendant. '34 Actually then, because both severance and other crimes
issues share the same basic concern for fairness to the defendant,
they represent but slightly different facets of the same issue.
IV.

A BETTER ALTERNATIVE

As Maryland case law amply demonstrates, current handling of
other crimes issues hardly represents a prototype for fledging legal
analysts. The rule as to other crimes evidence appears in one
exclusionary principle with eight separate identifiable exceptions.
One of these exceptions, identity, is further divided into ten
sub-exceptions. '35 Additionally, courts determining that an exception
applies must thereafter resort to a complicated balancing test to
decide whether to admit evidence of other crimes. '36 Given this
degree of complexity and outright confusion, any attorney or judge
must necessarily encounter difficulty. In fact, numerous legal
treatises and writings bluntly, and at times even vehemently,
criticize the unwarranted complication accompanying the other
crimes dilemma. '37
The rule of exclusion and its exceptions had their genesis in a
turn-of-century New York decision, People v.' Molineaux. '38 In that
case, the Court of Appeals of New York attempted to implement a
policy against convictions predicated solely on a defendant's bad
character, the basic concept now recognized in Maryland. '39 To
accomplish this purpose, the New York court formulated a rule of
exclusion of evidence of other crimes which it stated was not an
absolute principle. '40 Consistent with this approach, the opinion then
noted exceptions to the rule but observed that "the exceptions to the
rule cannot be stated with categorical precision."'41 Nevertheless, the
court then attempted to do just that, and furthermore implicitly
recognized its formulation as exhaustive, saying, "Let us now

134. State v. Jones, 284 Md. 232, 395 A.2d 1182 (1979) (homicide); McKnight v.
State, 280 Md. 604, 375 A.2d 551 (1977) (robbery),
135. See note 75 supra.
136. See text accompanying notes 115 & 116 supra.
137. E.g., Annot., 88 A.L.R.3d 8 (1978); Annot., 42 A.L.R.2d 854 (1955); Annot.. 40
A.L.R.2d 817 (1955); Annot., 20 A.L.R.2d 1013 11951>; Annot., 15 A.L.R.2d 1080
(1951>.
138. 168 N.Y. 264, 61 N.E. 286 11901>. Professor Stone attributes the first express
formulation of the "MIMIC" exception to Molineaux. Stone. The Exclusion of
Similar Fact Evidence: America. 51 HARV, L. RE\,. 988 (1938).
139. See, e.g., Dobson v. State, 24 Md. App. 644, 335 A.2d 124 (1975); Gilchrist v.
State, 2 Md. App. 635, 236 A.2d 299 (1967); Gorski v. State. 1 Md. App. 200.
228 A.2d 835 11967>.
140. People v. Molineaux, 168 N.Y. 264, 292. 61 N.E. 286. 294 (1901).
141. Id. at 293, 61 N.E. at 294.
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endeavor to apply to the case at bar each of these exceptions to the
general rule."142 After the court determined that the proffered
evidence fit into none of the categories it had devised, it reversed a
conviction for murder by poisoning. 143
The rule of exclusion formulated in Molineaux ultimately
received richly deserved criticism. The most eloquent came from
Professor Stone who derisively labeled the Molineaux exclusionary
principle as the "spurious rule."144 In fact, in his initial criticism of
Molineaux/ 45 Stone noted that while British courts unconsciously
utilized and applied a rule of exclusion for a time, with the advent of
the Makin case,146 the English now adhere to what he termed the
original or inclusionary rule which he stated as follows: "Evidence
which is relevant merely as showing that a person has a propensity
to do acts of a certain kind is not admissible to prove that he did any
such acts."147
Current British Commonwealth cases, using essentially the
same inclusionary rule as formulated by Stone, have set forth the
criterion that unless the evidence of other crimes demonstrates
propensity and nothing else, it is admissible. 148 Such a rule represents a better alternative to the confusion the exclusionary rule has
spawned because it directly focuses on the policy the courts seek to
implement. It seeks the avoidance of convictions bottomed solely on
propensity.149 Furthermore, those few American jurisdictions using
142. [d. at 294, 61 N.E. at 294.
143. [d. at 335, 61 N.E. at 310.
144. Stone, The Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: America, 51 HARV. L. REV. 988,
1005 (1938l.
145. Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: England, 46 HARV. L.
REV. 954 (1933).
146. Makin v. Attorney-General for New South Wales [1894] A.C. 57. Makin states:
In their Lordships' opinion the principles which must govern the
decision of the case are clear, though the application of them is by no
means free from difficulty. It is undoubtedly not competent for the
prosecution to adduce evidence tending to shew that the accused has
been guilty of criminal acts other than those covered by the indictment,
for the purpose of leading to the conclusion that the accused is a person
likely from his criminal conduct or character to have committed the
offence for which he is being tried. On the other hand, the mere fact
that the evidence adduced tends to shew the commission of other crimes
does not render it inadmissible if it be relevant to an issue before the
jury, and it may be so relevant ifit bears upon the question whether the
acts alleged to constitute the crime charged in the indictment were
designed or accidental, or to rebut a defence which would otherwise be
open to the accused. The statement of these general principles is easy,
but it is obvious that it may often be very difficult to draw the line and
to decide whether a particular piece of evidence is on the one side or the
other.
[d. at 65.
147. Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: England, 46 HARV. L.
REV. 954, 976 (1933),
148. See, e.g., Regina v. Lawson, [1971] 4 W.W.R. 350 (citing cases).
149. See the text accompanying note 139 supra.
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an inclusionary rule at one time or another experienced no apparent
difficulty applying that rule. ISO At the very least this approach would
eradicate the cumbersome exclusionary rule and its eight ill-defined
exceptions.
The inclusionary rule would avoid other disadvantages of the
exclusionary rule as well. First, the exclusionary rule causes judges'
concern to focus on precisely what constitutes a particular exception
as opposed to whether the evidence offered only goes to propensity. 151
Second, the exclusionary rule may exclude evidence not solely
demonstrative of a defendant's bad character because it fails to fall
within an exception to the exclusionary rule; or it may admit proof of
bad character simply because prosecutorial ingenuity in presentation
causes it to fall within an exception. 152 The inclusionary rule does not
risk these dysfunctional results, however, because its primary
emphasis mirrors its purpose, the avoidance of convictions based
solely on bad character.
Maryland can ill afford any of these deleterious by-products of
the exclusionary rule. In fact the state's jurisprudence already
150. E.g., People v. Woods, 35 Cal. 2d 504, 218 P.2d 981 (1950); Day v.
Commonwealth, 196 Va. 907, 86 S.E.2d 23 (1955). In the Woods case, the court
stated:
It is settled in this state that except when it shows merely criminal
disposition, evidence which tends logically and by reasonable inference
to establish any fact material for the prosecution, or to overcome any
material fact sought to be proved by the defense, is admissible although
it may connect the accused with an offense not included in the charge.
35 Cal. 2d at 509,218 P.2d at 984. Since Woods, California has codified this rule
in the following language:
(a) [E]vidence of a person's character or a trait of his character . . . is
inadmissible to prove his conduct on a specified occasion.
(b) Nothing in this section prohibits the admission of evidence that the
person committed a crime, civil wrong, or other act when relevant to
prove some fact (such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident) other than his
disposition to commit such acts.
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1101 (West 1966).
The Day case states:
The accepted rule to be derived from the cases is that evidence which
shows or tends to show the accused guilty of the commission of other
offenses at other times is inadmissible if its only relevancy is to show
the character of the accused or his disposition to commit an offense
similar to that charged; but if such evidence tends to prove any other
relevant fact of the offense charged, and is otherwise admissible, it will
not be excluded merely because it also shows him to have been guilty of
another crime.
196 Va. at 914, 86 S.E.2d at 26-27. For some reason, however, Virginia has
now adopted the cumbersome exclusionary approach. See, e.g., King v.
Commonwealth, 217 Va. 912, 234 S.E.2d 67 (1977); Jordan v. Commonwealth,
216 Va. 768, 222 S.E.2d 573 (1976).
151. Stone, The Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: America, 51 HARV. L. REV. 988,
1005-06 (1938),
152. Comment, The Admissibility of Other Crimes in Texas, 50 TEX. L. REV. 1409,
1410 (1972),
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contains precedential authority for the admission of other crimes
evidence that does not strictly fall within one of the exceptions to the
rule of exclusion in a case involving rebuttal testimony.ls3
Furthermore, a 1973 Fourth Circuit case from the District of
Maryland, United States v. Woods/ 54 embraced the inclusionary
approach to the other crimes issue. In that case, a defendant charged
with the murder by suffocation of her infant foster son objected to the
introduction of evidence demonstrating that beginning in 1945 the
defendant had custody of or access to nine children who suffered at
least twenty cyanotic episodes with seven deaths resulting. 155 While
the evidence did not fit squarely into any of the exceptions to the
exclusionary rule, the Fourth Circuit upheld admission of the
evidence because it was not introduced solely to demonstrate
criminal propensity.ls6 Additionally, the court stated the following
proposition of law:
[E]vidence of other offenses may be received, if relevant, for
any purpose other than to show a mere propensity or
disposition on the part of the defendant to commit the crime,
provided that the trial judge may exclude the evidence if its
probative value is outweighed by the risk that its admission
will create a substantial danger of undue prejudice to the
accused: 157
In essence, then, while the Woods court refused to be bound by
the strictures of the exclusionary rule's arbitrary categories, it still
achieved the purpose of avoiding a conviction solely based on
propensity. There is no reason whatsoever why Maryland could not
adopt this approach. Aside from the many commentaries favoring
it,IS8 the wording of the inclusionary rule promotes an analysis of
153. Setzer v. State, 29 Md. App. 347, 348 A.2d 866 (1975). The purported rebuttal
evidence in Setzer was excluded because it did not serve to rebut defendant's
testimony. Rather, it showed only propensity.
154. 484 F.2d 127 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 979 (1974l.
155. [d. at 130.
156. [d. at 134. See also Note, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1074 <1974l.
157. United States v. Woods, 484 F.2d 127, 134 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S.
979 (1974l.
Unfortunately, despite the clarity of the proposition in Woods, a recent
Fourth Circuit case, United States v. Johnson, 610 F.2d 194 (4th Cir. 1979),
frames the rule pertaining to evidence of other crimes in exclusionary terms.
This formulation, however, was only dictum, as the court disposed of the case
on the issue of whether a purported error at the trial was prejudicial. [d. at 196.
The Johnson case did not mention Woods.
158. E.g., Comment, Other Crimes Evidence at Trial: Of Balancing and Other
Matters, 70 YALE L. REV. 763 (1961); Trautman, Logical or Legal Relevancy, A
Conflict in Theory, 5 VAND. L. REV. 385 (1952); Stone, The Exclusion of Similar
Fact Evidence: America, 51 HARV. L. REV. 988 (1938); Comment, The
Admissibility of Other Crimes in Texas, 50 TEX. L. REV. 1409 (1972); Gregg,
Other Acts of Sexual Misbehavior and Perversion as Evidence in Prosecutions for
Sexual Offenses, 6 ARIZ. L. REV. 212 (1965); Note, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1074 <1974>.
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other crimes issues that is predicated upon the policy the law seeks
to implement.
V.

CONCLUSION

Although current Maryland law generates more confusion than
clarity in the area of other crimes evidence, the situation is hardly
without a remedy. The courts have an alternative, the inclusionary
rule. This new rule could supplant with little difficulty the
exclusionary rule and its exceptions which are now used by the
Maryland courts. Additionally, under an inclusionary formulation,
judges would still have the pertinent considerations of fairness to the
defendant as useful guidelines for an analysis more immediately
concerned with criminal propensity. In this manner, the courts could
finally implement, rather than subvert, the policy behind the current
rules pertaining to the admissibility of other crimes evidence.

Michael Patrick May

